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How could it have been that the outside of Plato’s academy called not for the brightest 
and best philosophers to join its ranks, but geometers (129)? In a contemporary con-
text: why is it that an increasing number of philosophers take the formal axioms of set 
theory as philosophical fundaments without subjecting them to critique? Such ex-
amples are exemplary of the question set out within How to be a Marxist in Philosophy: 
why do certain assumptions, taken from outside the discipline of philosophy, ground 
its inquiry, and what are the results of this dislocation from one another? One thesis in 
response to this question (philosophical practice, for Althusser, creates theses in re-
sponse to questions, as opposed to the solutions to the problems posed by science 
(21, 35)), might be because, in the language of both Aristotle and Alain Badiou, math-
ematics is the language of ‘being qua being,’ and only mathematics expresses the 
primary qualities of things (Aristotle 1981; Badiou 2011). To presume such a founda-
tion however, for Althusser, would be to ignore the benefits accrued by those who ad-
vocate, in this case, the primacy of mathematics and reproduce the relations of pro-
duction of knowledge. Grounding ontology upon any discourse that exists outside it is, 
for Althusser, a capitulation to a particular set of interests that are served by, in the ex-
ample of Plato, geometry (138). The production of knowledge, even in the academy 
Althusser insists, is much more political than we realise (117). 
In making this claim, Althusser splits philosophy in two unequal parts: first is the major-
ity of idealists who, through their quietist acceptance of their relation to socio-political 
power and an unwillingness to investigate what is at stake in upholding a certain set of 
objective and universal ‘facts,’ wed themselves to dominant political classes and 
propagate the conditions of their ideological suppression (33). The second, material-
ists, are characterised as those philosophers who, because they realise that philosophy 
is not science (ie. that it advances theses in response to local questions and does not 
claim universal validity in its concepts), declares war against the totalising pretensions 
of the first (49). In  foregrounding the social conditions, relations of power and ideolo-
gical struggle that contextualise our accounts of the world, Althusser pits the abstrac-
tion of idealism — a philosophy that he argues repeatedly builds theoretical Towers of 
Babel upon the rubble of the old (27) — against an atheistic materialism — the philo-
sophy of the Marxist philosopher — which tears down these mythic constructions in 
order to better understand concrete social practices and and where they exhibit (135). 
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There are at least two significant ways in which How to be a Marxist in Philosophy is an 
important addition to Althusser’s oeuvre, much of which still remains unpublished. 
First, in his insistence that the functions of science and philosophy are different, and 
that idealists are complicit in the operation of state power when they attempt the latter, 
Althusser provides here a powerful rejoinder to the recent upsurge of indifferential 
philosophy, who deterritorialise the language of set theory from its origins in mathem-
atics into disciplines as far removed as ontology (Badiou, Meillassoux) and literature 
(Watkin). Pulling no punches, Althusser is clear that when philosophers talk about the 
‘order of orders’ — and here he even name-checks Badiou’s appropriation of set theory 
four years even before the publication of Being and Event (2011) — they ‘also talk about 
authority, and therefore about power: and since there is no power but established 
power, that of the ruling class, they plainly serve its power, even if the are unaware of it 
and especially if they think they are combatting it’ (33-4). Whilst such authors are un-
likely to be swayed by his argument, focused as they are on particular ideas that have 
emerged within the history of thought, this is precisely Althusser’s point: by not taking 
into account the socio-political role of both their work and the assumptions it main-
tains, and it’s relationship to the relations of state power, they are unknowingly compli-
cit with the latter (136-8).  
Secondly, and importantly Althusser scholars who focus on the cohesion of his work, 
this book also marks the completion of a task he set out 18 years before its publication. 
In 1966, Althusser sent the first of three Notes to his colleagues in the Theoretical 
Working Group on Spinoza (Alain Badiou, Étienne Balibar, Yves Duroux and Pierre 
Macherey, amongst others), in which he outlined a project to establish the relation-
ships of constitution and reproduction of the four discourses comprising the social 
formation: science, ideology, philosophy and art (Althusser and Matheron 2003: 
34-35). Rather than remaining axiomatically distinct from each other (qua Badiou), each 
discourse, Althusser suggested, expresses objects in a particular manner, but in a 
manner that doesn’t preclude other discourses from expressing objects in different, 
potentially both productive and problematic, ways. To take an example from his first 
Note, the manner in which the concept ‘subject’ is used in science is different, and has 
different implications, then when it is used in an ideological context, and productive 
(materialist) philosophical analysis would draw out and clarify these differences (Ibid: 
48). In How to be a Marxist in Philosophy, Althusser makes his most systematic account 
of, first, how this is the case and, secondly, why it is that materialist philosophy is tasked 
with understanding, demystifying and expressing the relationship between these dis-
courses. 
This demystification is, for Althusser, not without it’s political ramifications and, as 
‘struggle in theory’ and constituting ‘acts of war,' materialist philosophical practice is 
not simply the process of bringing to bear the teachings of just another philosophical 
truth against idealism (39). Rather, it is the fight to re-appropriate ideas away from any 
dominant ideology that claims it can provide the key to truth  (39, 113, 117). In this 
manner, one can be a Marxist in philosophy by allying oneself with the fight against the 
state’s appropriation of the production of knowledge, and idealism as its tool of doing 
so. As he has emphasised elsewhere, Goshgarian (2016: 5), Althusser’s long-time and 
adroitly critical translator, points out, in a highly useful introduction to the text, that the 
relationship between Althusser’s elaboration of Marxist philosophy and the dictator-
ship of the proletariat is clear (xxv). Everyone, for Althusser, is accordingly a philosoph-
er, but not necessarily with the language of the philosophers which they may not know, 
and Marxist philosophy is important because, before Marx, ‘philosophy may be said to 
have played its role without being aware of the conditions determining it: to have 
played its role blindly’ (141). Marxist philosophers are therefore important in disrupting 
the cosy associations between philosophy’s assumed presuppositions and statist ideo-
logy, and they do this to help (everyone) ‘invent new forms of community that would 
make the state superfluous’ (xxix). 
Whilst Althusser’s book is important for at least these two reasons (with Goshgarian’s 
introductory contextualisation and commentary being a third), this is not to say the 
book is an easy read. The book’s no fewer than 26 chapters bear no relationship to its 
contents, which reads instead like a matrix of the book’s key ideas linked together with 
brackets and arrows, and at least 13 instances of putting off discussion to a later point 
in the book (or indeed another book entirely) becomes grating. Occasionally, 
Althusser’s tone veers from that of a highly principled academic to that with which your 
old friend might use over a coffee, and it becomes unclear for whom Althusser inten-
ded this book (83). Compounding this ambiguity is the discursive manner with which 
Althusser addresses this history of thought: his evidently compendious knowledge is 
often glossed in the manner a friendly Master might use with the children under his 
care, and readers may be unconvinced by his assertions. How to be a Marxist in Philo-
sophy lacks therefore the persuasive tone of works such as Reading Capital (1970) and 
Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists (2011), though 
Althusser’s tour through the history of both key ideas and thinkers is nevertheless en-
lightening if the reader approaches this book generously. 
This tour is embarked upon following an initial seven chapters that distinguish idealism 
from materialism. Althusser uses this distinction to claim that, whilst idealists follow sci-
entists in their question the entrap the world within one-or-another totalising frame-
works, ‘only materialist philosophers are revolutionaries, as they are creators’ (38).  The 
idea of creation is not developed explicitly elsewhere, however it underpins his argu-
ment that materialist philosophy poses theses which are born out in practice (whereas 
idealism relies upon the logical consistency of its hypotheses for it to be called 
‘correct’) (41-40). The tour then comprises chapters eight-twenty, associating the core 
philosophical ideas (truth (41); subject/object (46, 76, 91); epistemology/ontology (55, 
75); law and rights (100, 103); theory/practice (112) and key figures in their develop-
ment with either the idealist or materialist camp (113-4). The final four chapters outline 
four key theses of materialist philosophy in Althusser’s description, and develop the 
allegiance of materialist philosophy to both class struggle and Marxism as its call to 
arms (143). These latter chapters are the most engaging and instructive of all, captur-
ing Althusser’s political zeal into a powerful socio-political critique of the relations of 
the production of knowledge. If there can ‘be no practice that is not under the domina-
tion of an ideology,’ and this includes philosophical practice, then even philosophical 
practice is ‘a question […] of maintaining or capturing state power and the state ap-
paratuses and […] of controlling and orienting the different practices as a function of 
the class antagonism that divides society into classes’ (132). 
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